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THE PROBLEM

In 1984, the Reagan administration decided to allow employers to
terminate employee benefit plans' (pension plans) to free surplus pension funds for investment in the economy. 2 This occurred at a time
*Dedicated to Dr. and Mrs. Ake Epstein for their sacrifice and support.
1. The problem affects only defined benefit plans. The overwhelming majority of pension
plans are defined benefit plans, which are to be distinguished from defined contribution plans.
See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's FundamentalContradiction:The Exclusive
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1112 (1988) (explaining the differences between defined
contribution and defined benefit plans). Defined contribution plans are like savings accounts.
Id. at 1112. The employee bears all of the investment risk and places into the plan as much
money as the employee chooses. Id. With defined benefit plans, the employer bears all of the
risk because the employer promises to pay a certain amount when the employee retires. Id. at
1112-13.

2. Steven Brostoff, Metzenbaum: Feds, States Failedto ProtectPensions, NAT L UNDERWRITER: LIFE AND HEALTH, July 1, 1991, at 5. When a plan terminates, whatever surplus is

left goes to the company in what is known as a "reversion." Until 1984, reversions were heavily
taxed by the I.R.S. and permitted only when the surplus had been created by an actuarial
mistake. See Neil Downing & Jeffrey L. Hiday, Retirement:Is Your Money Safe?, PROVIDENCE
JOURNAL-BULLETIN, May 6, 1990, at Fl (detailing the evolution of the pension annuity problem). However, when stock prices began to boom in the early 80s, companies began to build
tremendous surpluses and the Reagan administration ended the I.R.S. rules prohibiting reversions. Id. This allowed companies access to the surplus funds, after which they either created
a new plan or sold the remaining pension assets into annuities. Id. See also AFL-CIO Callsfor
Federal Remedy to Shield Retirees from Insolvencies, 18 BNA PENSION REP. 1533 (Aug. 26,
1991) (detailing AFL-CIO argument that companies shopped for the cheapest annuities so that
they could get more cash from the reversion and arguing that reversions are prohibited by
ERISA) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Calls for Federal Remedy].
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when the insurance industry was introducing new products which offered much higher interest rates than insurance products had ever
offered in the past.3 The newer products and higher interest rates
were responses to competition from brokerages, mutual-fund companies and banks, all of which were able to begin paying money market
rates in the early eighties.4 Two of these products, tax-deferred, fixed
rate annuities and guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), 5 became
extremely popular choices for fiduciaries charged with investing pension funds.6 The pension annuities became popular because they offered
a high rate of return from an industry with a stable history and a
7
conservative tradition of investing.
However, starting in the mid to late eighties, the competition with
other investment entities, and intense competition within the annuity
industry itself, led insurance companies to become involved with junk
bonds and to invest more heavily in real estate. s The recent collapse
of these two markets, along with other economic factors, led to a
"crisis" in the insurance industry.9 Since the spring of 1991, two of
the nation's largest insurers were taken over by state regulators, and
twelve more were identified by the United States Department of Labor
as being in danger of insolvency.10 In 1991 state regulators had taken

3. Anne Saker, Changes in 80's Cause Heat in 90's, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 8, 1991, at BI;
see also Susan Pulliam & George Anders, Mutual Benefit Life Took Plenty of Risks and Is
Paying the Price, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1991, at Al, col. 6 (stating that the whole insurance
industry "plunged too deeply" into real estate).
4. Saker, supra note 3, at B1.
5. This note will refer to both products as "pension annuities."
6. Jane Bryant Quinn, Is Your Pension Fund Safe?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 22, 1991, at 47.
There are two types of tax deferred annuities. The simplest form gives regular payments for
life beginning any time after age fifty-nine and a half, in return for a lump sum investment.
See John Waggoner, What You Get When You Buy ... , U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at B2
(describing new products insurance companies began offering in the early 80s). "Variable annuities," on the other hand, allow the investor to choose among several investment options and
the return depends on how well the investments do. Id. GICs are very much like banks'
certificates of deposit and pay a set rate for one to five years. Id.
7. See Saker, supra note 3, at BI (stating that the insurance industry offered high rates
with image of being secure financial institutions).
8. Pulliam & Anders, supra note 3, at Al, col. 6; Are You Really Insured?, Bus. WK.,
Aug. 5, 1991 at 43. At the end of 1990, insurers on average had 11.4% of their bond holdings
in junk bonds, of which 19.6% was in higher risk, low quality junk bonds. Saker, supra note
3, at B1. Insurers had 24% of their money in real estate, of which 5% was in repossessed
property or defaulted mortgages. Id. However, these percentages were much higher at the two
largest companies that folded, Mutual Benefit Life and Executive Life. Id.
9. Are You Really Insured?, supra note 8, at 43.
10. Mayer Siegel & Carol Buckman, Reform of Termination Insurance, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
12, 1991, at 3.
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over 34 insurers by October, compared with 32 in all of 1990 and 13
in all of 1988.11
The portfolios of the two largest insurance companies that failed
in 1991, Executive Life of California and Mutual Benefit Life of New
Jersey, both had large amounts of pension annuities.12 Their well-publicized collapses created shock tremors through both the insurance and
pension industries.1 3 There were news stories about people losing their
pensions, runs on other insurance companies, and calls for nationalization of the insurance industry from Capitol Hill. 4 The threat of more
insolvencies seemed compelling when it was revealed that both com-

panies had been rated highly by the top rating companies shortly

5
before they collapsed.1
There was also an outcry from workers and labor advocates.16 Indeed, holders of pension annuities offered by insolvent insurance companies may have more to fear than other consumers and creditors of
insurance companies. 7 Pension annuity holders may suffer additionally
from the fact that the federal government regulates pensions, while
the states regulate the insurance industry.18 Because of their dual
nature, pension annuities fall into a grey area between state and

federal regulation.
Because insurance regulation is left to the states,1 9 when an insur-

ance company fails, ideally, the company's consumers are paid off by

11. Saker, supra note 3,at B2.
12. Officials Defend Efforts to Protect Pensions Following Insurance Failures, 18 BNA
PENSION REP. 1280 (July 29, 1991) [hereinafter Officials Defend Efforts].
13. See id. (testimony at congressional hearings of represenatives from the insurance industry, the Labor Department and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)).
14. Nightline: InsuranceCompany FailuresHit Pension Funds (A.B.C. television broadcast, July 18, 1991).
15. Eric N. Berg, Insurers' Raters Are on the Spot for Inaccuracy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1991, at 1, col. 2. The Mutual Benefit Life failure was more of a shock because it was "widely
known" that Executive Life had invested heavily in junk bonds. Id. However, Mutual Benefit
had limited its investments in junk bonds and was considered a "top line, conservative insurer,
which appeared capable of meeting fiduciary obligations." Officials Defend Efforts, supra note
12, at 1; see also Siegel & Buckman, supra note 10, at 3 (describing Executive Life's high
ratings).
16. See AFL-CIO Calls for Federal Remedy, supra note 2, at 1533 (reporting that the
AFL-CIO urged congressional action to insure that workers whose employers purchased Executive Life annuities did not lose their pension benefits).
17. See id.
18. See Siegel & Buckman, supra note 10, at 3 (general description of the limits of federal
and state regulation in the pension annuity context).
19. McCrarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
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the state's guaranty fund. 20 However, all of the state guaranty funds
are different, and, until recently, a few states did not even have
guaranty funds. 21 Most states' funds do not cover GICs,- and those
that provide for annuities only insure a limited amount.- Often, policy
holders must wait a year or more to be paid.? Thus, depending on
the individual's state of residence and whether the product is a GIC
or an annuity, a holder of a pension annuity from a failed insurer will
probably struggle to receive any portion of the money owed under
the policy.In contrast, the federal government regulates pensions under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).26 The federal government also insures pensions through the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), the arm of the Labor Department that guarantees pensions.27 However, when pension funds are sold into insurance
annuities, the guarantee of the PBGC ceases.- Pension annuities, then,
are strictly the province of state regulation, which offers only marginal
protection.
Thus, under current regulation, the only viable relief for holders
of pension annuities from failed insurance companies is an ERISA
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the fiduciary who
originally purchased the annuities. One of the arguments against
changing the current regulatory framework is that those who suffer
from the primary flaw of state insurance regulation, gaps in the annuity
and GIC coverage, have an ERISA remedy against employer-

20. Quinn, supra note 6, at 47.
21. Id. New Jersey and Louisiana voted in 1991 to start guaranty funds. John Waggoner,
No Quick Fix for Policyholders, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at B2. Washington D.C. does
not have a guaranty fund. Id. An individual is covered by the guaranty fund of the individual's
home state, not the insurance company's. Id.
22. Waggoner, supra note 21, at B2.
23. Id.; see GuaranteedFund Coverage, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at B2 (detailing the
extent of each state's guaranty fund coverage for each of the major insurance products).
24. Waggoner, supra note 21, at B2.
25. See Eric N. Berg, Life Insurer Failures Point Up Flaws in Safety Nets of States,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1991, at Al, col. 5 (detailing reasons critics say the state guaranty system
is "woefully unprepared for a crisis of this magnitude"); Susan Pulliam, Many Policyholders
Have Little Protection If Insurers Go Bust, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1991, at Al, col. 6 (reporting
that depositors at banks, thrifs, and credit unions have more protection).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
27. Quinn, supra note 6, at 47.
28. Brostoff, supra note 2, at 5; see Downing & Hiday, supra note 2, at F1 (quoting the
Chairman of the PBGC stating, "Congress intended PBGC's insurance funds to be used only
for plans that did not have sufficient assets . . . and not to provide for annuities directly.").
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fiduciaries.- This note examines this ERISA remedy and identifies
potential problems with the remedy's application in the pension annuity
context. Next, this note discusses the three primary ERISA fiduciary
duties to determine whether a fiduciary who has exchanged pension
funds for annuities can always be held liable, and to suggest that
courts may have some trouble applying these duties in the pension
annuity context. These problems are certain to receive clarifying treatment from courts, since employees have recently filed two suits against3
employers who exchanged pension funds for Executive Life annuities. 1
Indeed, more suits will follow as the fallout zone from the insurance
crisis widens.

II. THE ERISA

FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS

Congress passed ERISA in 197431 in response to rampant abuse
in the pension industry, including the loss of pensions due to fraud
and mismanagement. ERISA was designed to protect pension participants and their beneficiaries "by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans,
and by providing appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access
to the Federal courts. '' 3 The fiduciary standards of conduct are set
out in the following section:
1104. Fiduciary Duties
(a)(1) [A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect
to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and(A) For the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering
the plan;

29. See Metzenbaum Developing Planto ProtectPensionersfrom Annuity Payer'sFailure,
BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS DAILY, Sept. 17, 1991, at 1 (insurance industry spokesperson
testifying to Congress, "We believe that ERISA's fiduciary standards are sufficient to ensure
that participants and beneficiaries receive secure annuities ... ") [hereinafter Metzenbaum
Developing Plan].
30. See Siegel & Buckman, supra note 10, at 4 (reporting film of United States v. Pacific
Lumber, N.D. Cal. No. 91-812 and United States v. Magnatek, E.D. Wis. No. 91-C-613).
31. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
32. Nancy F. Bern, Note, FiduciaryResponsibility: Prudent Investments Under ERISA,
14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1066, 1068 (1980).

33.

29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
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(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting
in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use
in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments
of the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with the provisions of this subchapter or subchapter III of this chapter.The ERISA fiduciary standards were modeled after the common
law of trusts.3 5 In fact, both the standards and the legislative history
closely follow the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.2 However, Congress modified what it borrowed from the Restatement.37 Congress
instructed that the fiduciary standards should only be applied in light
of the "special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans."' Congress intended more flexibility than the common law rule had allowed,
instructing that section 1104 should be interpreted in light of the size
and scope of the plan. 39 At the same time, Congress wanted exacting

34. Id. § 1104(a).
35. Lewis G. Kearns, Rules of Diversification Under ERISA, 120 TR. & EST. 736 (1976).
Common law prudence traces its origins to Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446
(1830), which departed from the prior rule that prudence was measured by preservation of the
corpus. See Bern, supra note 32, at 1070. Harvard College instructs that prudence is measured
by analogizing to a prudent man, managing his own affairs. Id. at 1071. This standard required
a balance between the prior emphasis, preservation of the trust, and supplying an income for
the beneficiary. See id. at 1071-72.
36. Bern, supra note 32, at 1070-73.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4651; Bern, supra note 32, at 1073 (Congress attempted to inject flexibility into the
common law standard).
38. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 37, at 4651.
39. Id.; see Morton Klevan, FiduciaryResponsibility Under ERISA's Prudent Man Rule:
What Are the Guide Posts?, 44 J. TAX'N 152, 153 (1976) (Congress recognized the great diversity
in employee benefit plans and expected the interpretation of § 1104 to vary with the size and
skill of the fiduciary and the type of plan); see also Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455,
1464 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 304 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5084) ("Congress has exhorted those who must interpret
and apply ERISA's fiduciary standards to do so 'bearing in mind the special nature and purpose
of employee benefit plans."')); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D. Haw.
1980) (§ 1104 establishes "uniform federal requirements to be interpreted both in the light of
the common law of trusts, as well as with a view toward the special nature, purpose, and
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standards that would offer beneficiaries maximum protection. 4o Thus,
a distinct case law evolved from the ERISA fiduciary standards. Currently, in interpreting ERISA's fiduciary rules, courts refer to the
common law of trusts, while aware of Congress's desire for more
flexible, contextual analysis than the common law seemingly allowed.41
The primary fiduciary duties created by ERISA are discussed briefly
in the following paragraph.
Section 1104(a)(1)(A) is called the "exclusive benefit rule," and is
ERISA's version of the common law duty of loyalty.4 A fiduciary
acting in the interest of any entity other than the plan and the plan
participants violates the rule.' Section 1104(a)(1)(B) is ERISA's version of the prudent person standard of common law." Again, Congress
45
wanted more flexibility here than was available at common law.
Thus, Congress sculpted a modified version of the common law prudent
person rule. 46 Instead of the common law prudent person "dealing in
his own affairs,

'47

the ERISA fiduciary should use the care that a

"prudent man acting in a like capacity... would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character."' The ERISA rule inspires more
flexibility and specific factual analysis than the common law, but is
still an objective test.49 Section 1104(a)(1)(C) instructs a fiduciary to
diversify the investment portfolio unless it is clearly prudent not to
do so . 0 At common law, diversity was only one factor in determining
whether a fiduciary had acted prudently. 51 The fact that Congress
made it a separate requirement reflects the importance of diversity.52

importance of modern employee benefit plans") (citing Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Fund,
458 F. Supp. 986, 990 & n.8 (E.D. N.Y. 1978)).
40. See Donovan v. Mazzola 716 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Sinai Hosp. v.
National Benefit Fund for Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 697 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1982))
("Courts have also recognized that in enacting ERISA Congress made more exacting the requirements of the common law of trusts relating to employee benefit trust funds.").
41. See Marshall, 507 F. Supp. at 383 (comparing ERISA diversity requirement with
common law of trusts).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1988); see Fischel & Langbein, supra note 1, at 1110.
43. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 1, at 1110.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); see Bern, supra note 32, at 1073.
45. Bern, supra note 32, at 1073.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988).
49. Klevan, supra note 39, at 153.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1988).
51. Bern, supra note 32, at 1075.
52. Id.
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However, the requirement is not absolute. Congress noticeably refrained from proscribing any specific formula, and a fiduciary has a
defense if the lack of diversity is "clearly prudent."' The next section
of this note applies each of these ERISA duties to pension annuities
and raises problems courts may have in applying those duties.
III.

THE EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT RULE

ERISA's exclusive benefit rule, ERISA section 1104(a)(1)(A),
states that a fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. . . ."5 Section 1103(c)(1), "the noninurement
rule," is another version of the exclusive benefit rule and states, "the
assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and
shall be held for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries. '55 The exclusive benefit rule
is ERISA's embodiment of the duty of loyalty from the common law
of trusts.5 6 Congress intended the rule to remedy cases of self-dealing
that were rampant throughout the pension industry before the passage
of ERISA. 57 In these cases, the exclusive benefit rule, along with
ERISA's remedial provisions, has proven to be "an effective corrective. "-

In the pension annuity context, even without any other evidence
of self dealing, the exclusive benefit rule would seem to prevent the
initial creation of the annuities. This is because most employers terminate the original plan and exchange the pension funds for annuities
to obtain surplus funds which were generated through the investments
of the original plan.59 The first step in the termination procedure is

53. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 39, at 5084.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988).
55. Id. § 1103(c)(1); see id. § 1106 (enumerating prohibited transactions and incorporating
the exclusive benefit rule); Fischel & Langbein, supra note 1, at 1108-09 (discussing ERISA's
exclusive benefit rule).
56.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TRUSTS

§ 170(1) (1957) (The trustee shall "administer

the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.").
57. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 1, at 1110.
58. Id.; see also Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226 (1983) (exclusive benefit rule violated
when trustees of plan lent plan funds to a convalescent fund of which they were also trustees).
59. See supra note 1; see also Fischel & Langbein, supra note 1, at 1151 ("Beginning in
1982, the runup in the stock and bond markets caused pension plan assets to experience a huge
increase in value. The number of overfunded plans burgeoned, and so did the number of termi-
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that the employer figures all of the liabilities of the plan. 6° Then, if
there are surplus funds, the employer terminates the plan, takes the
surplus in what is known as a "reversion," and uses the balance (what
the plan owes out in liabilities) to purchase the annuities.61
At first glance, terminations of pension plans followed by reversions
of surplus assets seem to violate the exclusive benefit rule.62 The
employer-fiduciary enters into a transaction with plan assets to increase the wealth of the company by receiving the surplus funds. The
transaction certainly is not performed for the "exclusive purpose of
63
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries."
However, terminations followed by reversions of surplus assets
are legal under other sections of ERISA, which effectively create an
exception to the exclusive benefit rule. ERISA sections 1341-1344
detail the procedures for plan termination. 64 Section 1344(d)(1) promulgates three requirements for reversion: all liabilities of the plan must
be satisfied, the plan itself must provide for reversion, and the reversion must otherwise be legal.r A Treasury Department regulation 6
provides one more criteria: the surplus must be attributable to a
mistaken actuarial assumption, which most often is that the expected
costs of plan operation exceed actual costs. 67 Thus, other sections of
ERISA make the reversion of surplus assets legal, even though the
reversions seemingly violate the exclusive benefit rule. 68 Without some
other evidence of self dealing or dual loyalty by an employer-fiduciary,
the exclusive benefit rule is not a major factor in the pension annuity
context.

nations whose purpose was to recapture the reversion for the employer."). But see Extending
PBGC Protection to Annuities Would Raise Problems, GAO Official Says, 18 BNA PENSION
REP. 784 (May 6, 1991) (stating that sometimes plans are terminated for reasons other than

recovery of excess assets and sometimes annuities are purchased for reasons other than plan
termination).
60.

See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 1, at 1150-53 (explaining the process and ramifica-

tions of asset reversion).
61.

Id.

62. Id.
63.

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988).

64. Id. §§ 1341-1344.
65. Id. § 1344(d)(1).
66. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-2(b)(1) (1991).
67. Jennifer L. Pratt, Note, Reversion of Surplus Assets Upon Plan Termination: Is It
Consistent with the Purpose of ERISA?, 62 IND. L.J. 805, 810 (1987) (detailing the policy

arguments against allowing reversions of surplus plan assets).
68.

See generally id.
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THE DIVERSITY RULE

ERISA section 1104(a)(1)(C) states that a fiduciary shall diversify
"the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so.

'69

The burden is first on the plaintiff to prove a lack of diversity and
then shifts to the defendant to prove that the lack of diversity was
prudent under the circumstances.70

The diversity rule initially appears to be the most obvious source
of liability for a fiduciary in the pension annuity context. The fact that
Congress included a separate, affirmative duty to diversify, instead
of leaving diversity as a sub-category of the prudent person standard,
is an indication of the importance that Congress attached to the requirement. 71 However, since the passage of ERISA in 1974, it remains
unclear just how much diversity is required and whether prudence is
a defense even in cases of a complete lack of diversity.
This question is crucial in light of the recent crisis in the insurance
industry and its effect on pension annuities.72 When an entire pension
plan is traded for insurance annuities, technically, the plan's assets
are not diversified at all. 73 The entire pension portfolio is composed
of annuity contracts, all from a single insurance company. 74 Thus, if
a purely technical or percentage analysis of diversity is required under
ERISA, the fiduciary breaches its obligation in the pension annuity
scenario. 75

69. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1988).
70. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 39, at 5084.
71. Bern, supra note 32, at 1070.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
73. See Jones v. O'Higgins, No. 87-CV-1002, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10537 (N.D. N.Y.
Sept. 1, 1989) (where the defendant-fiduciary concentrated all of the pension assets into three
high-risk stocks, the least technical diversity that has been allowed, the Jones court held that
even though the plan lacked technical diversity, the defendant's investment strategy was prudent
under the circumstances); see also infra text accompanying notes 101-09 (explaining Jones in
detail).
74. See Quinn, supra note 6, at 47 (describing the transfer of pension funds to annuity
contracts). But see Jerry Geisel, Employers Seek to Limit GIC Losses: Executive Life Fiasco
May Hit 401K Plans, Bus. INS., May 13, 1991, at 3 (indicating that sometimes only part of
the fund is invested in annuities).
75. If courts make the first level of analysis, technical diversity, determinative, a pension
annuity defendant does not have a chance. Some courts appear to do this, implying that when
diversity falls below a certain floor the diversity rule has been breached. See Whitfield v.
Tomasso, 682 F. Supp. 1287, 1301 (E.D. N.Y. 1988) (concentrating between 25% and 89% of
assets into one type of investment breached the diversity rule); Sandoval v. Simmons, 622 F.
Supp. 1174, 1211-12 (D.C. Ill.
1985) (investing 18.5% in one type of investment, 11% in another,
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However, Congress explicitly declined to set a specific ceiling or
percentage amount to indicate diversity under ERISA. Congress
wanted a more flexible rule which would require a fiduciary and the
courts to consider the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 76
Thus, the fiduciary has a defense if the lack of diversity was prudent
"under the circumstances. '" This emphasis is also reflected in the
"guiding factors" for determining diversity contained in the congressional conference report for ERISA: (1) the purpose of the plan; (2)
the amount of plan assets; (3) financial and industrial conditions; (4)
the type of investment; (5) the plan documents; (6) geographic and
industrial distribution; and (7) dates of maturity. 8
The last four factors are more susceptible to mechanical, bright
line application than the others. 79 One commentator interpreted
number (4), "the type of investment," as recommending simply that
the fiduciary seek more than one type of investment.Y° Number (5)
makes plan documents a factor, even though ERISA treats violations
of plan documents under a separate, implied strict liability provision.,1
Number (6) recommends geographic and industrial distribution.
Number (7), "the dates of maturity," is a "routine element in selecting
a portfolio of maturing or callable senior securities, such as bonds,
debentures, notes, or preferred stocks."'

and 14% in another did not breach the diversity rule). But see Brock v. Citizens' Bank of Clovis,

841 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir. 1988) (concentrating 65% of the assets in first mortgages constituted
only a preliminary breach, after which defendant was not able to show that the lack of diversity
was prudent).
76. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 39, at 5084-85; see Note, Fiduciary Standards
and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88
HARV. L. REV. 960, 966-68 (1975) (arguing that pension plan fiduciaries should get more flexibility than provided by the common law of trusts because of differences between conventional
trusts and pensions).
77. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 39, at 5084.
78. Id.
79. Kearns, supra note 35, at 736-37.
80. See id.
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1988). This section instructs a fiduciary to act in accordance with the plan documents and functions as an implied strict liability provision. See Bern,
supra note 32, at 1076 n.84 (citing Knickerbocker, Federal FiduciaryStandards, in G. MUNCH,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INSURED PENSIONS § 22.03(2), at 50 (T. Spencer & P. Walker, rev.
ed. 1976)). A fiduciary who violates the instructions of plan documents will always be liable
under ERISA. See id. at 1065 & n.84. However, the plan documents can serve as a defense
for fiduciaries as well. Arkakelian v. National W. Ins. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1080, 1082-84 (D.D.C.
1990). In the pension annuity context, a fiduciary who is accused of breaching the diversity
requirement by investing all of the pension funds into insurance annuities does not violate
ERISA if the plan documents instruct the fiduciary to purchase the annuities. Id. at 1083-84.
82. Kearns, supra note 35, at 736-37.
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Congress intended much of the analysis under the ERISA fiduciary
standards to focus on whether the fiduciary's behavior was prudent
under the facts and circumstances of the case.- However, the last
four guiding factors do not offer the fiduciary many contextual prudence arguments in the pension annuity context. Fiduciaries battling
charges of violating the diversity requirement probably did not seek
more than one type of investment and did not distribute industrially
or geographically.
The other three guiding factors, however, inspire more contextual
analysis and open up potential arguments of prudence for the
fiduciary.8 Thus, under number (2), "amount of plan assets," a smaller
plan may be much more difficult to diversify, and not seem to present
much risk of large loss when invested in a large insurance company. 5
Also, under number (3), "financial and industrial conditions," the
fiduciary can argue that annuities from a top rated insurance company
seemed like the safest alternative, particularly with the volatile economy of the late eighties and early nineties 86, and the stable history of
the insurance industry.87
Likewise, under number (1), "purpose of the plan," the fiduciary
can argue that annuity contracts seemed like the most prudent vehicles
to satisfy the purpose of the plan. Most pension plans are defined
benefit plans.s8 Their purpose is to "produce a guaranteed specified
pension for participants. This requires using funding media which in
amount and type will produce the required funds."8 9 Thus, fiduciaries
are required to insure that the plan pays out what it originally promised the participants, usually in the form of a monthly payment very
much like an annuity payment.9 0 This requires the fiduciary to invest

83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 738; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1957) (indicating that it
may be proper to concentrate all of a very small trust in a single investment); see also Klevan,
supra note 39, at 152-53 (arguing that Congress intended the prudence determination to depend
on the size of the plan or the employer).
86. Louis S. Richman, Who Is Nick Brady? Why It Matters, FORTUNE,May 22, 1989, at
60 (this is an era of "huge budget and trade deficits, volatile interest and exchange rates, and
skittish global financial markets").
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1957) ("So also, in times of crisis and
general financial instability, it may be proper to invest a large portion or even the whole trust
estate in a single type of security."); Saker, supra note 3, at B1-B2 (stating that the industry
offered high interest rates and the image of being financially secure).
88. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 1, at 1112.
89. Kearns, supra note 35, at 737.
90. Cf. id. (noting that a typical pension plan may guarantee a joint and survivor annuity
in the form of monthly payments).
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the pension funds to insure that there will be enough to pay all that
the pension originally promised. 91
Insurance annuity contracts appear to be a perfect investment,
especially in a volatile economy, because the contracts themselves
promise to fulfill the "purpose of the plan," that is, paying each participant the amount promised under the plan. 92 This is true even if
the insurance company invests the particular pension funds in such a
way that the insurance company loses money. 93 An insurance company,
unlike many employers and fiduciaries, has a diversified pool of general
assets with which to pay out the contracts, even if those particular
contracts lost money for the insurer.Y
Thus, annuity contracts seem like prudent investments that fulfill
the purpose of the plan. By getting insurance companies, who themselves have extensive, highly diversified assets, 95 and a history of
stability and safety, 96 to promise to fulfill the "purpose of the plan,"
the fiduciary has taken substantial steps to "minimize the risk of large
losses. '97 Otherwise, in more conventional investing procedure, when
a plan loses money through the investments of the fiduciary, the
fiduciary makes up the difference. 98 However, the fiduciary may be
unable to cover such losses, especially if it is a small employer without
extensive capital or other resources. Thus, a compelling prudence
argument is offered when it reasonably appears to the employerfiduciary that an insurance company is in a better position to fulfill

91. See id.
92. See Waggoner, supra note 6, at All (stating that GICs and annuities promise a set
rate of return).
93. See Stephen H. Goldberg & Melvin S. Altman, The Case for the Nonapplication of
ERISA to Insurers' GeneralAccount Assets, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 475, 480-81 (1985) (describing
insurers' general accounts and arguing against extending ERISA fiduciary standards to insurers'
administration of these accounts).
94. See id. at 478.
95. See id.
96. See Eric N. Berg, New Ratings a Milestone for Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1991,
at Dl, col. 6 ("Until recently, virtually all of the big insurance companies had been considered
rock solid - their ability to pay claims beyond question."); Are You Really Insured?, supra
note 8, at 43 (stating that "life insurance has long seemed a potent and benevolent force in
society, . . ." and "policies were grounded in a bedrock of solid investments"); Downing &
Hiday, supra note 2, at F1 ("Annuities used to hold the reputation of stodgy, but dependable
investments.").
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1988).
98. See Kearns, supra note 35, at 737 (analyzing the apparent ERISA intent that when a
loss occurs and the beneficiary is not paid what the plan promised, then the fiduciary can be
sued).
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the purpose of the plan by paying on annuity contracts. 99 The employerfiduciary, on the other hand, may reasonably appear to be less able
to cover losses or diversify investments.' °°
Using a similar, contextual analysis regarding the prudence defense, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York in a 1989 case, Jones v. O'Higgins,- held that an investment advisor who invested all of the plan assets into only three high
risk stocks did not breach the diversity requirement. 0 2 The court
relied on testimony of the defendant investment advisor and his expert
to find that the defendant acted prudently even without diversity. 10
This was because the defendant's "contrarian" investment philosophy
was known to the trustee plaintiff and was acknowledged by expert
testimony as reasonable, relatively common and credible within the
'
investment industry. 1
Defendant and defendant's expert witness testified that the
philosophy involved finding under-valued stocks of a few companies,
putting most or all of the assets of the plan into the stocks, and then
holding the stocks and probably incurring some short term losses until
the stock rebounded. 0 5 When the plan lost around $500,000, the trustee
plaintiff withdrew the remaining assets and sued the defendant.1°6
The Jones court accepted defendant's argument that under contraianism it was necessary to hold onto the stocks until they rebounded
to make large profits, that if there were too much diversity the strategy would not generate substantial profits, that the plaintiff knew
this, and that if the plaintiff had not withdrawn the funds prematurely
the plan would have made a large profit. 0 7 The court also relied heavily
on the expert testimony that defendant's behavior was reasonable by
industry standards. °s Thus, even though the investments were not
diversified, they were "clearly prudent" under the circumstances.'°0

99. See generally Klevan, supra note 39, at 152-53 (stating that Congress apparently intended prudence determination to depend on size and skill of fiduciary).
100. Id.
101. No. 87-CV-1002, 1989 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10537 (N.D. N.Y. Sept. 1, 1989).
102. Id. at *21.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *5-6.
106. Id. at *8.
107. Id. at *18-22.
108. Id. at *21.
109. Id. at *22.
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The analysis used by the court in Jones was of the type intended
by Congress when it passed ERISA and is consistent with the guiding
factors of the committee reports. 110 The court first found a prima facie
lack of diversity, and shifted the burden to the defendant."' The court
then used a contextual analysis to find that the defendant had acted
prudently. 112 In doing so, the court noted prevalent industry standards
in finding that the defendant's strategy, even given the lack of diversity, called for the plan to achieve its purpose.113
In the pension annuity context, the prudence defense used by the
defendant in Jones will cause problems for courts, especially in the
context of smaller employers who invest in highly rated insurance
companies. Such employers have strong prudence arguments, especially under industry standards and financial and industrial conditions.
Employers can argue that investment in pension annuities was, under
the financial and industrial conditions at the time, a prudent way to
attempt to achieve the pension plan's purpose. Employers also can
argue that purchasing pension annuities from highly rated insurance
companies was reasonable under industry standards. These arguments
may be enough to counter a plaintiffs initial showing of a lack of
diversity and relieve the defendant of liability under the diversity
requirement.
V.

THE PRUDENT PERSON RULE

ERISA section 1104(a)(1)(B) requires a fiduciary to act "with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims. 1 14 Like the diversity rule, the prudent
person standard was derived from the common law of trusts, but with
Congress' instruction that the requirement be interpreted in light of
"the special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans.115 Also
like the diversity rule, there was concern shortly after ERISA's pas-

110. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 39, at 5084-85.
111. Jones, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10537, at *17.
112. Id. at *17-25; see supra text accompanying notes 101-09.
113. Jones, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10537, at *17-25; see supra text accompanying notes
101-09.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988).
115. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 37, at 4650; see also Klevan, supra note 39, at 153
(explaining that Congress wanted to take into account the great diversity in the administration
of employee benefit plans).
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sage that the new prudence rule would retain too much of the common
law's inflexibility.116 Over time an objective test evolved, focusing on
whether the fiduciary "(1) employed proper methods to investigate,
evaluate, and structure the investment, (2) acted in a manner as would
others who have a capacity and familiarity with such matters, and (3)
exercised independent judgement when making investment decisions.",17

Courts' emphasis in applying the test appears to be on the first
prong, often phrasing the prudence rule as the "duty to investigate"
or "monitor. '118 The other prongs tend to help courts define and clarify
what is adequate monitoring or investigation. Consequently, some
courts clarify the duty to investigate and monitor by emphasizing that
the investigation or monitoring be independent, as required under the
third prong. 11 9 Thus, one court stated, "[a] fiduciary's independent
investigation of the merits of a particular investment is at the heart
20
of the prudent person standard.'
Other courts emphasize the second prong and examine whether
the investigation or monitoring was done in a manner consistent with
that done by others in like capacity. 121 Often, this analysis is accomplished through an evaluation of industry standards. The court in
Jones, for example, found the defendant's contrarian investment practices prudent because they were "within the standards and practice
in the investment industry."',- The plaintiff in Jones argued that by
allowing the value of the plan to lose $500,000 in nine months, the
defendant had breached his duty to monitor the investments.123 When
the plan began to lose money, the plaintiff argued, the defendant
should have switched investments.'2
In response, the court emphasized that to find the defendant liable,
the plaintiff would have to prove the defendant "acted imprudently

116. See Bern, supra note 32, at 1073 n.56 (describing the legislative hearings in which the
Nixon administration rejected the common law rule as "too inflexible and undiscerning of the
vast diversity in pension plans").
117. Jones, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10537, at *22.
118. See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[c]ourts have
focused the inquiry under the 'prudent man rule' on a review of the fiduciary's independent
investigation of the merits of a particular investment").
119. Id.
120. Fink v. National Say. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
121. See, e.g., Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980).
122. Jones, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10537, at *24.
123. Id. at *23.
124. Id.
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within the standards of the investment industry."' 125 Instead, the defendant introduced evidence that his contrarian investment strategy was
reasonable by investment industry standards. 126 Evidence introduced
by the plaintiff that the plan's assets were "severely diminished," by
itself, was not enough.m7
To define industry standards, the relevant industry must be identified. In Jones, that determination was easy.128 Because the fiduciary
129
was an investment counselor, the investment industry was used.
However, in the typical pension annuity case, the fiduciary is the
employer, not an outside investment counselor.3o Therefore, the relevant industry would not have the high level of investment expertise
of the investment industry.' 3' ERISA's legislative history rejects the
idea that the statute requires the fiduciary to be a prudent expert
with professional investment skills.132 Instead, "the expertise required
of the fiduciary will vary with the size and scope of the plan."13 Thus,
the relevant analysis in the pension annuity context should focus on
other employers of comparable size who sell their pension funds into
insurance annuities where the parent insurance companies of those
annuities have remained completely healthy.
A large and easily discernible model exists. In 1983, there were
32.4 million Americans covered by pension plans funded through life
insurance companies.'3 Reserves held by these companies to support
contractual obligations to private pension plans amountdd to $264.6

125.
126.
127.

Id. at *24.
Id. at *23.
Id. at *24.

128.

Id. at *5.

129.
130.

Id. at *21-22.
The focus is almost entirely on employers as the fiduciaries in the pension annuity

context. Thus, one argument in support of reforming ERISA or nationalizing the insurance
industry is that by the time participants stop receiving their pension annuity benefits, there
may not be an employer around to sue under ERISA. See Metzenbaum Developing Plan, supra

note 29, at 1.
131. See Klevan, supra note 39, at 153.
132. Beim, supra note 32, at 1075; see Klevan, supra note 39, at 153 (stating that only
banks, trust companies, investment advisors, and the like are required to be prudent experts,

while others are held, to a less rigorous standard).
133. Bern, supra note 32, at 1075. But see Jane Applegate, Leave Management of the
Pension Plans to the Professionals,WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1991, at 11, col. 3 (ERISA requires

that plan trustees must "not only act in a prudent manner but also manage the fund as an
expert would.").
134. Goldberg & Altman, supra note 93, at 482 (citing AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE
INSURANCE, PENSION FACTS (1985)).
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billion.1- Thus, a relevant model for the industry standards used in
cases like Jones can be easily ascertained in the pension annuity context and would be the many pension-annuity consumers who appear
to have made prudent decisions. Thus, if a particular fiduciary did not
independently investigate or monitor an insurance company as compared to other employers who sold their pension funds into annuities,
that fiduciary would breach the prudent man rule.
Although there are no cases applying the duties to investigate and
monitor in the pension annuity context, an analogous situation is presented when an employer entrusts the assets of a plan to an investment
company or advisor. In that situation, the employer is subject to the
ERISA fiduciary standards and must investigate or monitor the investment company or advisor. 136 Thus, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York in a 1988 case, Whitfield v.
Cohen,137 held that a fiduciary violated the duty to investigate because
the fiduciary failed to investigate any aspect of an investment company.1- The fiduciary had turned over the assets of a pension plan to
the investment company, which subsequently caused the plan to lose
over $600,000 (the original investment of over $280,000 plus opportu-

nity

cost).139

However, after the fiduciary is held liable for failure to investigate,
the Whitfield court emphasized that it "must then examine whether,
considering the facts that an adequate and thorough investigation
would have revealed, the investment was objectively imprudent."14
The Whitfield court held that there was no evidence to show that
even if the fiduciary had prudently investigated, he could have discov41
ered the problems with the investment company.
The Whitfield court went on to state, however, that the fiduciary
also had a duty to monitor after the initial investment decision. 142 The
court found that the fiduciary had not attempted to monitor the investment company.143 The court also found that there was evidence to

135. Goldberg & Altman, supra note 93, at 482.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988) (stating that a person is a fiduciary "to the extent i)
he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
a plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets.)"
137. 682 F. Supp. 188 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
138. Id. at 195.
139. Id. at 193.
140. Id. at 195.
141. Id. at 196.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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show that if the fiduciary had properly monitored the activities of the
investment company, he would have been alerted to the many problems with it, and been able to withdraw the plan assets and prevent
a large loss.'" Thus, for a fiduciary to breach the prudence rule, a
court must determine that adequate investigation or monitoring would
have revealed the problems with the investments.
The Whitfield court relied on a 1984 decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Katsaros v. Cody.1'" In Katsaros, the fiduciaries made a two million dollar loan of pension assets
to a bank which was subsequently closed by state and federal regulators. 116 The security for the loan was stock of the bank. 147 None of
the fiduciaries had any expertise or experience to judge whether the
bank was healthy or whether the loan was a sound one.'4 They simply
149
relied on the information supplied by the bank.
The defendant-fiduciaries in Katsaros argued that they made a
reasonable investigation given their lack of knowledge of the banking
industry.150 The Katsaros court held that the defendants had failed to
conduct a reasonable investigation, which would have revealed that
the loans were unwise.'15 The court went on to say that the defendants,
even with their lack of knowledge, could have fulfilled the duty to
15 2
investigate by seeking outside assistance from an expert.
Thus, Jones instructs that the investigation and monitoring must
be reasonable by industry standards.1 Whitfield states that the duties
to investigate and monitor are analyzed on two levels: whether the
duties were actually fulfilled and if not, whether they could have been
fulfilled. M' Katsaros instructs that non-experts can fulfill the duties to
investigate and monitor by seeking outside assistance from experts."5
It is difficult to predict how this law will be applied in the pension
annuity context, where the most obvious "experts" fulfilling the re-

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 197.
744 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 275.
Id.

149.

Id.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 279.
Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 279.
See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
Whitfield, 682 F. Supp. at 195.
Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 279.
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quirements of Katsaros are the insurance rating companies.'- Rating
companies are commonly used to evaluate the health of insurers both
by private individuals and institutional investors. 57 Thus, if an insurer
had a bad rating from a rating company, it would be difficult for a

defendant to argue prudence. Because rating companies are so widely
used by anyone who is even remotely involved in the insurance industry, referring to one before purchasing an insurance product is an
obviously prudent alternative.
However, in both the Mutual Benefit Life and Executive Life failures, the insurers were highly rated by the top rating companies up
until shortly before they failed. 15 Thus, the question is whether checking with the rating company, by itself, satisfies the requirement to
investigate and monitor. The resolution of the question will depend
on the facts of the case and, to a great extent, the timing of it.
Before 1991, there was no insurance "crisis" and most thought that
there was only a remote chance of losing an investment in the insurance

industry. 159 Most thought that the insurance companies that failed
were smaller insurers that probably did not have high ratings anyway.160 The specter of large insurance companies with high ratings
failing probably seemed inconceivable. 16 Thus, prudent investigation
and monitoring, consistent with common practice and available infor-

156. See Writing, Dialing for Ratings, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at B2 (listing the
rating companies).
157. Berg, supra note 15, at 1, col. 2 ("Many people frequently check them to see whether
their pension money, savings plans or life insurance policies are safe."); Berg, supra note 96,
at D1, col. 6 (downgrading of six major insurance companies may prompt pension trustees to
withdraw funds from those companies); How Safe a Bet Is Your Insurer?, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct.
9, 1991, at B2 ("For most people, the best way to evaluate an insurer is to rely on the professional
ratings services.").
158. Berg, supra note 15, at 1; Siegel & Buckmann, supra note 10, at 4. Executive Life
seemingly represents a blatant failure on the part of the rating companies because knowledge
of Executive Life's questionable junk bond holdings was "widespread." Id. On the other hand,
Mutual Benefit Life had a sterling reputation before it failed. See Officials Defend Efforts,
supra note 12, at 1280 (asserting that Mutual Benefit Life "was considered a top line, conservative
insurer").
159. See supra note 96; see also Richard S. Teitelbaum, How Safe Is Your Insurance?,
FORTUNE, Sept. 9, 1991, at 138 (reporting that an Executive Life annuitant stated, "I knew
the history of the industry ....
No life insurance company large enough to operate across state
lines had ever been allowed to fail.").
160. See Moody's Anticipates FurtherDownward Adjustment of U.S. Life Insurers, BNA
PENSIONS & BENEFITS DAILY, Oct. 2, 1991, at 1 (reporting that Executive Life was "dismissed
as an aberration" because of its reputation as an "upstart" company).
161. See supra note 96.
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mation about the insurance industry, may have been to simply check
162
the ratings.
However, now, after the well-publicized insolvencies of Mutual
Benefit Life and Executive Life and the failure of the rating companies
to spot the problems, prudent investigation may consist of something
more than checking the ratings. One result of the recent failures is
that the ratings companies themselves have changed. 163 They are reforming the way they analyze insurance companies and focusing more
on the amount of junk bond and risky real estate holdings that insurers
possess.' 6 ' Consequently, after the Executive Life and Mutual Benefit
Life failures, some other insurers were downgraded by the rating
companies. 1' Thus, ratings, while not foolproof, now appear to more
did before the Executive
accurately reflect insurer health than 16they
6
Life and Mutual Benefit Life failures.
Even given the recent reform of rating companies' evaluative procedures, some argue that it is relatively easy to take additional steps
in investigating insurers. 6 7 These steps include checking whether the
insurer uses independent actuaries, the insurer's reputation in the
market place, asset quality, ability to withstand a run (liquidity) and
history with state regulators. 1' Also instructive is the state where
the insurer is registered, because some states offer more protection
69
and have a better reputation for insurance regulation than others.

162.

See Berg, supra note 96, at Dl, col. 6 (quoting an insurance executive recommending

that, even in light of the recent crisis, adequate investigation is satisfied by simply checking
the ratings - but only insurers receiving the very highest ratings should be considered).
163. See Berg, supra note 15, at 1 (detailing the changes made after the Executive and
Mutual Benefit Life failures and the criticism that the rating companies have an inherent conflict

of interest because their primary customers are the insurance companies themselves).
164.

Id.; see also Assessing Insurer Ratings, Bus. INS., Aug. 12, 1991, at 8 (rating com-

panies seem to be "refining their rating procedures").
165. Berg, supra note 96, at Dl, col. 6; see also Moody's Anticipates FurtherDownward
Adjustment of Some U.S. Insurers, supra note 160, at 1 ("Moody's Investors Service expects

further downward adjustments on of its ratings of some U.S. life insurance firms.").
166.

See Assessing Insurer Ratings, supra note 164, at 8 (although they have improved

their procedures, rating companies have the same problem that state regulators do: relying on
"financial statements that are months old."); Berg, supra note 15 (quoting an insurance executive
who recommended only dealing with insurers which receive the highest rating possible).
167.

Assessing Insurer Ratings, supra note 164, at 8.

168. Id.; see also Teitelbaum, supra note 159 (compute liquidity by the ratio of capital to
surplus using information supplied in the insurer's annual report).
169. See How Secure Is Your Nest Egg?, FORTUNE, Aug. 12, 1991, at 51; see also Guaranteed Fund Coverage, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at All (detailing the guaranty fund coverage
of each state); Teitelbaum, supra note 159, at 138 (describing New York as a leader in insurance

regulation).
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Likewise, the contractual terms of the annuity purchased are important. Thus, in light of the recent publicity, it may be imprudent
to purchase an annuity with a high cancellation or surrender fee,
because the fiduciary should be aware of the risk of insurer failure. 170
On the other hand, such terms in annuities purchased before the recent
publicity could be a defense by a fiduciary charged with violating the
duty to monitor by not canceling the annuities. Often, even after an
insurer has been taken over by state regulators, it is imprudent to
cancel or transfer the annuities because of high penalties. 171
All of the above steps can be performed relatively cheaply, without
hiring an outside expert. Also, they probably would have revealed
the problems with Executive Life where, even though it was rated
72
highly, many knew of its heavy investments in risky junk bonds.1
However, because the economic conditions on which insurers' investments rely can change so quickly, sometimes it may be virtually impossible to foresee insurer failure. 173 The Mutual Benefit Life failure
caught almost all by surprise.' 74 In the end, much as Congress intended, the prudence question will be determined by the facts of the
case. However, even if industry practice and common knowledge dictated otherwise before 1991, it is now clear that something more than
checking the ratings is required in prudently investigating and
monitoring insurers. How much more will depend on the facts of the
case, but the practical effect of the recent "insurance crisis" will probably lead courts to require that fiduciary-employers monitor and investigate insurance companies much more thoroughly then they did be-

fore. 175
VI.

CONCLUSION

The primary factor in determining a breach of both the diversity
and prudent person rules is the prudence idea derived from common

170. Assessing Insurer Ratings, supra note 164, at 8. The major rating services have not
always accurately forecast the future solvency of insurance companies. Id.
171. Teitelbaum, supra note 159, at 138 (switching insurers may not be worth the expense).
172. Siegel & Buckmann, supra note 10, at 4.
173. Assessing Insurer Ratings, supra note 164, at 8; see Berg, supra note 15, at 1 ("No
ratings agency could have predicted that panicked policyholders would flock to cash in their
policies. Nor could the agencies have predicted that regulators would seize companies still afloat.
A major part of the problem . . . is that insurance companies are far more complex than
they were a decade ago" because of new, more complex products and the newly volatile real
estate market).
174. Officials Defend Efforts, supra note 12, at 1281.
175. Moody's Anticipates Further Downward Adjustment of Some U.S. Life Insurers,
supra note 160, at 1.
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law. 176 For diversity, prudence is a defense when investments are not
diversified and is usually measured by the seven "guiding factors,"
most notably plan purpose and economic and industrial conditions. 177
Economic and industrial conditions, as well as independent evaluation,
also affect the determination of a breach under the prudent person
rule. 17 8 While the common law prudence standard allowed for some
flexibility, 79 Congress intended to derive even more flexibility from
both the diversity and prudent person determinations under ERISA. 180
Thus, in the pension annuity context, defendant-fiduciaries who invest
in pension annuities from a highly reputed and rated company like
Mutual Benefit Life will have strong prudence arguments under the
diversity and prudence rules. However, those same prudence arguments will lose their effectiveness if the annuities are purchased after
the recent publicity of the "insurance crisis." The industry has lost
its reputation of stability and conservatism and a prudent fiduciary
now should investigate a company thoroughly before purchasing pension annuities.

176. See supra text accompanying notes 69-109, 114-52.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 74-109.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 114-52.
179. Bern, supra note 32, at 1073 (stating that the original flexible rule of Harvard College
v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830), has been narrowed through the years).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
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